



Medical NBC Briefing Series Medical NBC Aspects of Crimean-Congo Hemmorhagic Fever









Purpose

- •This presentation is part of a series developed by the Medical NBC Staff at The U.S. Army Office of The Surgeon General.
- •The information presented addresses medical issues, both operational and clinical, of various NBC agents.
- •These presentations were developed for the medical NBC officer to use in briefing either medical or maneuver commanders.
- •Information in the presentations includes physical data of the agent, signs and symptoms, means of dispersion, treatment for the agent, medical resources required, issues about investigational new drugs or vaccines, and epidemiold Office of the Surgeon General
- •Notes pag

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for the Army





Outline

- Background
- Battlefield Response
- Medical Response
- Command and Contr
- Summary
- References







Background

- Disease Background
- Disease Course Summary
- Signs and Symptoms
- Diagnosis
- Treatment
- Current Situation
- Weaponization










Disease Background

- RNA viruses Nairovirus
- Crimean-Congo Hemmorhagic Fever isolated in 1956
- 15-50 case mortality rate Epidemic noted in 1996 in Africa
- Spread to humans by contact with infected animals or arthropod vectors (ticks)
- Incapacitating disease with a fatality rate of 15-70%



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


Crimean-Congo Fever Disease Course Summary In Untreated

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| L | limbs | anorexia Incubat | ion 1-14 | | | |
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| ľ | iemorrhag | e, shock→l Incubat | eath ion 1-14 | 1 10 | illar. | |
| | | Days | | | 2397 | |
| Day 15 | Day 16 | Day 17 | Day 18 | Day 19 | Day 20 | Day 21 |
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- 1-14 day incubation period - often transmitted by tick bite
- Sudden onset of Fever, Chills, Hypotension,

- Acute and severe hemorrhage
- Prolonged recovery
- Loss of strength, dizziness, hair loss after recovery





Diagnosis Clinical

- Large numbers of individuals in the same geographic area presenting over a short time span
- Acute onset of









Diagnosis Laboratory

- Blood testing
- Requires maximum biosafety laboratory
- Handling specimens should be with extreme caution and special collection and handling methods must be used







Treatment

- Isolation of known cases
- Ribavirin
- Supportive care substantial advanced medical supportive may be necessary
 - Intensive care unit facilities
 - Oxygen
 - Hydration (IV therapy)
 - Ventilation support for severe cases
 - Pain management
 - Clotting factors
- A vaccine has been developed but is not available







Current Situation

- Currently endemic in parts of Asia and Africs
- As a biological warfare agent, Crimean-Congo Fever poses a significant threat to ground troops
 - Highly transmissible
 - Infectious
 - Lethal
 - Easily dispersible to ground troops as an aerosol
 - Stable in the environment
- International deployments
- Risk of importation/exportation of disease

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Weaponization

Aerosolization

- Inhalation threat
- Delivery systems can be si
 - Spray systems
 - Sub munitions
 - Detonation containers
 - Crop duster or boat
 - Bomblets
 - Aircraft







Battlefield Response to Crimean-Congo Fever

- Detect
- Protect
 - Individual protection
 - Collective protection







Detection

- Possible methods of detection
 - Detection of agent in the environi
 - Clinical (differential diagnosis)
 - Medical surveillance (coordination enhances detection capability)
- Diagnosis of Crimean-Congo Fever is not presumptive of a BW attack
 - the disease may be endemic to the area



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Detection of Agent in the Environment

· Biological SmarEnvironment

Tickets

 Enzyme Linked Immunosorbant Assay (ELISA) (Fielded with the 520th TAML)

 Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) (Fielded







Detection of Agent in the Environment (cont.)

- M31E1 Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS)
- Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD)





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Clinical Detection

Sudden presentation of

- Fevers, chills, eye infections, and mild hypotension presenting in groups
- Rapid progression of symptoms







Laboratory Confirmation

- Division medical assets lack lab equipment to conduct test to determine hemorrhagic fevers
- Specimen must be sent to theater level or CONUS lab
 - Unit SOP's for collection
 - Safety precautions
- Lab specimens should be submitted to the correct diagnostic laboratory
- Contact lab prior to collection or preparation in order to assure proper

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Laboratory Confirmation (cont.)

Points of contact for biological sampling and shipping


- Corps Chemical Officer
- Technical Escort Unit
- AFMIC
- 520th TAML
- USAMRIID
- WRAIR
- CDC







Medical Surveillance



Clues in the daily medical disposition reports of a BW Attack

- Simultaneous presentations of large numbers of infected
- Natural outbreaks would have an index case and the numbers would build
- Numerous reports of fevers, chills, eye







Protect Individual Protection

- Mask and BDO with gloves and boots.
- Standard uniform clothing affords a reasonable protection against dermal exposure to biological agents
- Casualties unable to wear MOPP should be handled in casualty wraps








Protect Collective Protection

Hardened or unhardened shelter equipped with an air filtration unit providing overpressure

- Standard universal precautions should be employed as individuals are brought inside the collective protection units
- RVF is communicable from person to person
- be decontaminated using 0.05% hypochlorite solution







- Evacuation or Quarantine
- Infection Control
- Resource Requirements









Triage and Evacuation

Triage

- Priorities based on severity of symptoms
- Respiratory support, ICU needs, and quarantine facilities will increase priorities

Evacuation -Immediate

- Considerable infection control precautions during transport
- Must consider quarantine in place in a mass casualty situation
- Evacuation of patients will be METT-T dependent





Evacuation or Quarantine




- CCHF patients not likely to RTD in the normal theater evacuation policy of 15 days
- Strict interpretation of the doctrine calls for evacuation

Quarantine

- Contagious
- Limit spread of the virus
- Unlike smallpox, CCHF is already endemic to various parts of the world

Guidance

- Before evacuating patients suspected of CCHF, seek guidance from the









Infection Control

- Communicable from person to person
- Single room with adjoining anteroom as only entrance
 - Hand washing facility with decontamination solution
- Negative air pressure if possible
- Strict barrier precautions
 - gloves, gown, mask, shoe covers, protective eyewear/face shield
 - consider HEPA respirator for prominent hemorrhage, vomiting, diarrhea, cough
- Patient remains Quartermaster section
 - Decontamination, embalming, transportation in hermetically sealed containers

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
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Infection Control (cont)

- Chemical toilet
- All body fluids disinfected
- Disposable equipment / sharps in rigid containers and autoclaved /incinerated
- Double-bag refuse-outside bag disit
- Electronic/mechanical equipment c paraformaldehyde disinfected







Resource Requirements

- Specialized evacuation assets
- Isolation facilities
- Ribavirin
- Supportive therapies
 - Vigorous IV therapy
- Intensive care facilities for severely compromised patients
- Possibility for quarantine of mass amounts of patients
- Specialized infection control equipment for







Command and Control

Intelligence

 Medical surveillance and intelligence reports are key to keep the Command alert to the situation

Maneuver

Quarantine or isolation is required of symptomatic patients

Logistics

- Additional Class VIII materials will be required and evacuation routes to Echelon III will be heavily utilized
- Specialized evacuation assets may be required

Manpower

 Many soldiers may be affected by aerosol dissemination in a short period of time







Command and Control Response to Psychological Impact

- May vary from person to person
- Psychological Operations
 - Rumors, panic, misinformation
 - Soldiers may isolate themselves in fear of disease spread

Countermeasures

- LEADERSHIP is responsible for countering psychological impacts through education and training of the soldiers
- Implementation of defensive measures such as crisis stress management teams 31 May








Summary

- Crimean-Congo Fever virus is highly infectious when aerosolized
- The possibility for weaponization is highly probable
- Detection may not occur until after exposure when patients are reported
- Command decisions that will be required upon detection of Crimean-Congo Fever:
 - Evacuation: Many patients will be presenting at one time. Methods of evacuation?
 - Treatment: Procurement of additional antiviral, supplies, and equipment? Isolation of affected troops? Intensive care facilities?



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